Soe and Sweeney's Simple Authenticated Key Agreement (SAKA) algorithm, based on the Diffie-Hellman method, is a password-based key agreement algorithm which is simpler than other published methods and prevents the man-in-the-middle attacks. However, SAKA is vulnerable to guessing attacks if passwords are poorly chosen. In this article, we further improve the SAKA method which is simpler than the SAKA algorithm and can defeat both the man-in-the-middle and guessing attacks.
Introduction
The Diffie-Hellman method [2] was proposed to provide two authenticated parties to agree on a session key in an insecure channel. However, since the exchanged messages were not authenticated by the two parties, it is vulnerable to the man-in-the-middle attacks.
To overcome this shortcoming, two major approaches had been taken [5] . One approach, such as the station-to-station protocol developed by Diffie et al. [3] , utilizes certificates from a trusted third party to certify the ownership of the keys. Therefore, the middle man cannot longer impersonate the messages without being noticed.
However, this approach suffers from the difficulty of extension to a larger system. The other approach, such as the encrypted key exchange method developed by Bellovin and Merritt [1] , assumes a secret password has been shared in advance by two parties and all exchanged messages can be encrypted by this shared secret password.
Though this approach defeats the man-in-the-middle attacks, it is too complicated and patented.
Seo and Sweeney proposed a simple authenticated key agreement (SAKA) algorithm [9] which is based on the Diffie-Hellman method. SAKA assumes Alice and Bob share a common password P in advance. Both Alice and Bob calculates Q and Q , SAKA algorithm is described as follows:
1. Alice chooses a random number r a and sends Bob
Bob chooses a random number r b and sends Alice
Soe and Sweeney show that the middle man can neither guess the public values such as (g a mod n) nor alter the values without being noticed. Also, SAKA generates the same amount of traffic as the Diffie-Hellman method with only two communications required to agree on a session key. Furthermore, Bob and Alice can validate the session key if ciphered messages cannot be decrypted correctly.
Though the SAKA algorithm is superior than other published schemes, it suffers from the guessing attacks if the chosen password P is small [4, 7, 6, 8] . If the chosen P is large enough, we do not see the necessity of calculating both Q and Q −1
. With the public value g replaced by P , the size of P is no longer a concern and the computation overhead is smaller since both Q and Q −1 are not required.
In the following section, we describe an improved key agreement algorithm which is simpler than SAKA. Note that the simplicity of this algorithm does not degrade any features provided by SAKA.
The Improvement
Similar to SAKA, we require Alice and Bob pre-share a common password P . By using a large prime number n which is made publicly available, our method is similar to the Diffie-Hellman method and is described as follows:
1. Alice chooses a random large number r a and sends Bob X a = P ra mod n 2. Bob chooses a random large number r b and sends Alice
Alice and Bob agree on a session key in two communications.
Analysis
In this section, we analyze the proposed algorithm with the SAKA algorithm in aspect of performance and cryptanalysis.
Performance Analysis
In the proposed algorithm, it is not necessary to calculate both Q and Q 
Cryptanalysis
Supposed a middle man eavesdrops messages in an insecure channel. When the middle man receives X a in step 1, with only knowing the value of n, he cannot guess r a since the problem is combined with the discrete logarithm and the secret password P . With the same argument, the middle man cannot guess the value of r b either. If the middle man intercepts X b , makes up a fake X m = F r m mod n where F is a fake password and r m is a random number generated by the middle man, and sends X m to Alice, Alice calculates the fake session key as
Since the middle man cannot obtain r a from X a (= P r a mod n), the middle man cannot agree with Alice on the fake session key K a .
Supposed that Alice sends a message M encrypted with K a (the ciphertext is
F r m r a mod n and since the middle man knows only X a = P r a mod n but not r a and P , the middle man cannot calculate K a to get M .
Conclusions
Soe and Sweeney's simple authenticated key agreement algorithm is based on the Diffie-Hellman method. With a pre-shared password between two parties, it allows two parties agree on a session key with only two communications, prevents the man-inthe-middle attacks, and is simpler than other published schemes. The major drawback of the SAKA algorithm is its vulnerability to the guessing attacks. In this article, we further improve Soe and Sweeney's scheme so that it is even simpler than the SAKA algorithm and defeats both the man-in-the-middle and guessing attacks.
